Public Opinion Survey
16 February 2026
A YouGov survey across October 2025 and January 2026 shows two-thirds of Syrians approving President Al-Sharaa, rejecting Hezbollah’s role in the country, and backing a security arrangement with Israel.
Approval of President Ahmed Al-Sharaa rose from 61% to 69% between October 2025 and January 2026, with Syrians broadly backing the new government’s foreign-policy direction, according to a Council for a Secure America survey conducted by YouGov.
The findings come thirteen months after the December 2024 fall of the Assad regime and six months after the June 2025 Israel–Iran 12-Day War — a period in which Iranian power projection into the Levant was substantially reduced.
Al-Sharaa approval rose from 61% to 69% across the two surveys.
The “very good” share alone hit 44% in January. That is the largest concentrated positive reading recorded in the survey.
Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria is rejected by seven-in-ten Syrians.
69% describe the involvement as negative; the “very negative” share rose from 53% to 59% across the two surveys.
The U.S. role is viewed positively at +51 net.
65% positive, 14% negative. Among the strongest U.S. readings in CSA’s cross-national polling.
64% support a security arrangement between the new Syrian government and Israel.
Up from 60% in October; 22% oppose.
Conditional normalization splits 17 points by gender.
Syrian men: 52% (44 net). Syrian women: 34% (24 net). The largest cohort gap in the survey.
The first survey, in October 2025, was fielded nine months after the December 2024 fall of the Assad regime and four months after the June 2025 Israel–Iran 12-Day War. The second survey followed three months later, in January 2026.
The intervening period saw political consolidation by President Al-Sharaa inside Damascus; continued Israeli operations along the Syrian buffer line and strikes against Iran-linked weapons-transfer infrastructure; the post-Hezbollah security environment hardening along the Syrian–Lebanese frontier; early movement on sanctions relief, reconstruction, and refugee-return frameworks; and the December 2025 onset of regional escalation toward the March 2026 Iran cycle. The Al-Sharaa approval gain is the central political fact of the period. Syria’s energy infrastructure reopened after Assad fell. Israeli strikes destroyed 70-80% of Syrian strategic military capabilities (IDF estimate, Operation Bashan Arrow), and operations along the Syrian buffer line continued.
| Question | Oct 2025 | Jan 2026 | Delta |
|---|---|---|---|
| How would you rate the performance of Ahmed Al-Sharaa as President of Syria? (Total Good) | 61% | 69% | +8 |
| Overall, how would you describe the impact of Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria? (Total Positive) | 5% | 5% | 0 |
| Overall, how would you describe the impact of Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria? (Total Negative) | 70% | 69% | −1 |
| How would you describe the role of the United States in Syria’s political and economic affairs? (Total Positive) | 63% | 65% | +2 |
| How would you feel about the new government of Syria signing a security arrangement with Israel aimed at ensuring Syria’s safety and prosperity? (Total Support) | 60% | 64% | +4 |
| How likely to unlikely do you think it is that there will be peace between Israel and Syria in the future? (Total Likely) | 64% | 59% | −5 |
| If there was a long-term resolution to the issue of Palestine, how would you view the normalization of diplomatic or economic relations between Syria and Israel? (Total Support) | 52% | 47% | −5 |
How would you rate the performance of Ahmed Al-Sharaa as President of Syria?
Overall, how would you describe the impact of Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria?
69% of Syrians describe Hezbollah’s involvement in their country as negative in January 2026, statistically unchanged from October. Positive views hold at 5%. Within the negative share, those calling the involvement “very negative” rise from 53% in October to 59% in January.
Hezbollah maintained a military presence in Syria for approximately two decades in support of the Assad regime, which fell in December 2024. Related: Lebanese Public Opinion Survey (February 2026). 79% of Lebanese say only the army should hold weapons in the country.
How would you describe the role of the United States in Syria?
65% of Syrians describe the role of the United States in Syria as positive in January 2026, statistically unchanged from 63% in October. 14% describe the role as negative, with the remainder offering no answer.
The +51 net positive reading is among the strongest readings for the United States in CSA cross-national polling in the region. Compare with U.S. public opinion on Iran and Israel.
The share of Syrians rating future peace with Israel as Likely or Very Likely moved from 64% in October 2025 to 59% in January 2026. The Unlikely share moved from 11% to 14%. The softening (−5 points) coincides with rising regional tensions ahead of the 2026 Iran cycle.
How would you feel about the new Syrian government signing a security arrangement with Israel?
64% of Syrians support the new Syrian government signing a security arrangement with Israel, up from 60% in October. 22% oppose. The “security arrangement” framing in the question refers to coordination short of full diplomatic normalization.
Support rises four points across the two surveys.
Asked about full normalization with Israel after a long-term resolution of the Palestinian issue, the Support share moved from 52% in October to 47% in January. The Oppose share was essentially flat at 12–13%. The gap between security-arrangement support (64%) and conditional full normalization (47%) is the most actionable single number in the deck.
If there were a long-term resolution to the issue of Palestine, would you support full diplomatic normalization with Israel?
47% of Syrians support full normalization with Israel conditional on a long-term resolution to the Palestinian question, with 34% net support. Among Syrian men the share rises to 52% (44 net); among Syrian women it falls to 34% (24 net). The gender split is the largest cohort gap recorded in the survey.
The 17-point gap between support for a security arrangement (64%) and conditional normalization (47%) is statistically significant.
Syrian public opinion gives the new Al-Sharaa government broad support across security, foreign-policy, and economic-cooperation choices. Approval of the president is rising rather than fading. Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria, built over two decades of supporting the Assad regime, is rejected by seven-in-ten Syrians, including a hardening “very negative” share. The U.S. role is viewed positively at +51 net.
The 17-point gap between support for a security arrangement (64%) and conditional normalization (47%) maps onto the Peace Through Prosperity sequence: practical economic and security cooperation precedes formal diplomatic recognition. For U.S. policy, the implication is that Syrian public opinion currently supports active engagement with the new government, including on the Damascus–Jerusalem security track.
If this primer series was useful to you, please consider supporting CSA’s ongoing regional research.
CSA fielded the Syria Public Opinion Survey through YouGov in two rounds: 257 Syrian adults in October 2025 (October 9–16) and 257 again in January 2026 (January 22–29). Both samples were drawn from YouGov’s online panel and weighted to match the demographic profile of Syrian adults.
The margin of sampling error for each round is approximately ±6.1 percentage points at the 95% confidence level.
The Council for a Secure America (CSA) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit 501(C)(3) educational organization. CSA educates on the link between U.S. energy security, national security, and diplomacy through original research, public-opinion polling, rapid response primers, and off-the-record briefings for policymakers, industry leaders, and civic institutions. CSA does not lobby or advocate for legislative or executive action.
